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Book Review
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF BILLS AND NoTEs. By William

Everett Britton. St. Paul. West Publishing Co., 1943. Pp.
xx, 1245.
To attempt to delineate in a single volume the modern
American law of a topic as broad in scope as an average
size law school course of instruction is a precarious project.
It is the best token of the excellence of the book under
review, and the sound scholarship of its author, Professor
Britton of the University of Illinois Law School, that he
has been able to produce such an outstanding short book
on such a broad and important subject.
It was high time that there should be published an acceptable book in the field. Until its appearance the only
usable short text was Dean Lile's 1928 revision (the first
in almost thirty years) of the Bigelow text. To be sure,
there has always been available the latest revision of the
Brannan's Annotated Uniform Negotiable Instrument Law
to present to the reader the relevant cases, once he had ascertained the applicable section of the statute, now universally in force in American jurisdictions these twenty
years.
But, despite the excellence of the Brannan notes, there
was still need for a good text, one that would, among other
things, help the reader to find out just what sections of
the statute are applicable to his problem, and discuss them
analytically. Without this latter information, of course,
the Brannan is not useful. And therein lies an important
contribution the Britton book makes, wherein the author's
technique stands out. This is in the skillful juggling and
discussion of the various separate parts of the statute
which may apply to the given problem.
An annoying thing about attempting to solve bills and
notes problems is that one may have to apply several different provisions of the statute, scattered throughout its
content. Whether it be because of poor draftsmanship of
the statute or the inescapable nature of the subject matter,
the fact remains that the statute does not give with clarity
the answer to many problems which recur with considerable frequency, and much juggling of various sections, and
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pursuit of analogies is inevitable in attempted solution.
Some of these problems include, whether a payee can be a
holder in due course, the negotiability of "acceleration"
notes, the negotiability of corporate bonds and mortgage
notes, the status of instruments payable in a foreign money,
whether post-maturity takers are subject to adverse claims
of ownership, and the consequences of a restrictive indorsement.
A fair sampling of the author's technique and of the
excellence of its execution can result from a description
of his handling the first-named of the above problems, that
of whether the payee of an instrument (if in fact he took
in good faith, without notice, before maturity, and for
value) can be granted the holder in due course's immunity
from personal defences to liability. To be sure, the problem cannot arise too frequently, inasmuch as it would be
infrequent for the payee neither to be a party to nor aware
of the defect which the obligor wishes to assert and can
assert against a non-due course holder. But, it is possible
for this to be so, where there are three parties to the initial
transaction and the defence which the obligor wishes to
assert against the payee involves some fraud or abuse of
trust by the third one, upon or to the disfavor of the obligor
who is being sued. Nowhere does the statute squarely answer the problem, may the payee claim as a holder in due
course an immunity from the defence if in fact he took in
good faith and without notice of it? Rather, the answer
to the problem must be made by juggling competing analogies from and interpretations of divergent sections of
the statute which contain phrases suggestive of implications which in turn may furnish the answer.
The author devotes a single section,' covering some fifteen pages, to this problem. In the black letter type which
summarizes the treatment he points out that the payee
usually cannot comply in fact with the requirements for
being a holder in due course, unless it be a three party
transaction, whereupon by the weight of authority he will
be treated as a due course holder, but that the applicable
sections of the Act are so worded that some courts have
been able to hold against the possibility of his being a
holder in due course.
He begins his detailed text treatment (after pointing
out that a substantial number of cases at common law allowed the payee to be a due course holder) with a state1 Section 122, pages 508-522.
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ment of the statute's sections which bear, pro and con, on
the answer to the problem. Those courts which under the
statute have held against the payee have tended to put it
on those sections which speak of "negotiation" to the
holder in order for him to be one in due course, arguing
that the delivery to the payee in the first instance is not
such a negotiation.
On the other hand, the principal argument in favor of
the payee is that the statute admits of his being a "holder"
and, therefore, he should be able to qualify as a holder in
due course, inasmuch as other phraseology of the statute
merely requires that such a person shall "take" the instrument in good faith. Other sections of the statute are then
pointed out to imply that a payee can be a holder in due
course. Then follows a survey of the periodical literature
of the subject, discussing the separate views of several law
review writers on the subject, as is similarly done in other
parts of the book.
This latter phase of the book is itself an important contribution of the text under review. The reader gets the
benefit of the author's distillation of the important periodical literature of the subject. In the approximate halfcentury since the Act was first drafted and promulgated,
much of the energy of the specialists in the field has been
devoted to preparation of law review articles on the manifold problems arising under the statute, this perhaps to the
exclusion of the earlier preparation of a satisfactory text.
Mr. Britton has made much of this writing accessible
through this text by citation and discussion of the periodical literature. His own earlier, frequent, and well-known
contributions to that literature, of course, form the basis
of his treatment in this text of those particular problems.
In one instance, by permission and with acknowledgment,
he shaped his treatment into a summary of the well known
Harvard Law Review essay by Professor Chafee on the
problem of post-maturity takers and claims of ownership.
In general outline, the book follows the six-chapter
breakdown of Mr. Britton's law school casebook on the
subject, the first edition of which appeared two decades
earlier. The six chapters are: formal requisites of negotiability, transfer, holder in due course, defenses and equities, liability of parties, and discharge. Certain specific
topics are handled in different ones of these chapters than
in the casebook but, aside from these occasional deviations,
the sequence of problems is the same, making the book
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more than otherwise valuable to teachers and to present
and former students who have studied his casebook.
From the present reviewer's standpoint, this book
should have appeared twelve or more months earlier at a
time when, upon a younger colleague's being called to the
colors in midstream of teaching the course, the present reviewer "reacquired" the subject after a five-year surcease,
and then was enabled to perpetrate the atrocious though
relevant pun that he had "become the holder of a new
course without value and on short notice."'
Having the Britton text at hand will definitely make
teaching the course a less unpleasant chore for the rest of
the "duration". But, the value of the book to teachers and
students, like its presentation of the periodical literature,
is but an incidental trait. It is an excellent and wellrounded presentation of the matured law of the field that
inevitably should be consulted by every lawyer or judge
who has a problem of bills and notes law.
-JOHN

S. STRAHORN, JR.*

2 The making of puns must be a failing of "reactivated" Bills and Notes
teachers. Recently, Professor Chafee of the Harvard Law School, who
had resumed teaching the subject through the fortunes of war, reprinted
his earlier law review essays on the subject, along with some addenda,
under the title "Reissued Notes on Bills and Notes" with the sub-title "Reissued Notes Circulated After Maturity and Indorsed for Collection Only.
Payable at Langdell Hall, Cambridge, Mass."
* Faculty Editor of the RKVIw.
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